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JURISDICTION 
The final order of the district court was entered on June 23, 2004. The notice of 
appeal was filed on July 7, 2004. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this 
Court on August 5, 2004. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)G) (2002). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Bilanzich frames only one issue on appeal, then raises two issues. Correctly 
framed, those issues are as follows: 
I. 
Whether attorney fees may be awarded under a guaranty in which the guarantor 
has guaranteed payment of attorney fees incurred with regard to the underlying obligation 
but there is no language in the guaranty itself regarding attorney fees incurred in litigation 
concerning the guaranty. 
Standard of Review. Whether attorney fees are recoverable under a contract is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. See R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, 
TJ16,40P.3dlll9 
Preservation. This issue was presented below and is preserved in the Record at 
R. 2432-2433, 2488-2489. 
1 
n. 
Whether a party who has successfully avoided his obligations under a contract by 
having it nullified can thereafter rely on that contract to obtain an award of attorney fees. 
Standard of Review. Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. See R.T. Nielson, 2002 UT 11 at l[fl6. 
Preservation. This issue was presented below and is preserved in the Record at 
R. 2520-2536. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (2002), which states: 
Reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees. A court may award costs and 
attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 
1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal challenges the trial court's denial of a motion for an award of attorney 
fees arising out of the terms of a personal guaranty. The trial court had previously 
entered a judgment declaring the guaranty unenforceable and nullifying the same. The 
guarantor, who successfully obtained that judgment, then sought his attorney fees based 
on the terms of the guaranty. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that its 
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prior ruling declaring the guaranty unenforceable precluded the guarantor from relying on 
the guaranty to recover attorney fees. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff/Appellant Michael Bilanzich filed this action in August 2000. His 
complaint named numerous defendants including Defendants/Appellees JDL Holdings, 
L.C. and John and Eunes Lonetti. JDL Holdings filed a separate action against Bilanzich 
which was consolidated into the instant litigation. With respect to JDL and the Lonettis, 
Bilanzich sought to rescind and have his guaranty declared unenforceable. He also 
sought a claim for unjust enrichment. JDL's complaint sought to enforce the guaranty 
against Bilanzich. 
In August 2003, Bilanzich filed a motion for partial summary judgment against 
JDL and the Lonettis. The trial court granted the motion and entered partial judgment 
against JDL and the Lonettis declaring the guaranty unenforceable. Subsequently, 
Bilanzich, JDL, and the Lonettis stipulated to a dismissal of the remainder of Bilanzich's 
claims against them. On February 23, 2004, Bilanzich filed a motion for an award of 
attorney fees. On June 23, 2004, the trial court denied the motion. Bilanzich appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In December 1996, Defendants/Appellees JDL Holdings, L.C. and John and Eunes 
Lonetti (hereafter collectively, "Lonetti") loaned Reese's Enterprises, Inc. ("REP) 
approximately $1,780,600.00 which loan was evidenced by a promissory note and 
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secured by a security agreement and trust deed. (R. 1822,1 2441.) In April 1998, Lonetti 
and REI entered into an agreement modifying the promissory note ("Modification") to 
increase the principal balance due to Lonetti from REI to $2,167,717.00. (R. 2441; see 
also Add. A.)2 The only parties to the Note were John Lonetti, Eunes Lonetti, and REI. 
(R. 2443; see also Add. A.) 
In his statement of facts, Bilanzich asserts that the Modification contains a 
reciprocal attorney fees provision that, according to Bilanzich, states: "If any action is 
instituted with respect to this Agreement or supporting documents, the prevailing party 
shall be entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs to be paid by the other parties." 
(Br. at 6) (Emphasis added.) This is not accurate. The attorney fees provision in the 
Modification provides: "If any action is instituted with respect to this Agreement or 
supporting documents, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
and costs to be paid by the other party" (R. 2442; see also Add. A P ) (Emphasis 
added.) The Modification contains a choice of law provision subjecting it to 
interpretation and construction under Nevada law. (R. 2442; see also Add. A f 4.) 
In reviewing the record, it appears that there are at least two pages in volume 7 of the 
record with the page number 1822. Page number 1822 cited herein is to an affidavit of 
John Lonetti submitted in a bankruptcy court action in Nevada, which is attached to an 
exhibit in Bilanzich's request for judicial notice. 
2
 A copy of the Modification is attached as Addendum A. 
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Subsequent to the Modification, litigation was initiated between Lonetti and REI 
which culminated in a settlement agreement. (R. 2084.3) The settlement agreement was 
memorialized in a document dated September 1999 and referred to as the "Term Sheet." 
(R.2084, 1776.)4 
On September 30, 1999, Bilanzich executed a guaranty ("Guaranty")5 in favor of 
Lonetti, guaranteeing to pay REI's obligations to Lonetti. (R. 528, 2445; see also Add. 
C.) The Guaranty contains a sentence which states, "[t]his Guaranty includes all 
principal, interest, costs, expenses, and attorney fees incurred in collection of the Note 
and realization of the security." (R. 528; see also Add. C.) 
In August 2000, Bilanzich initiated this litigation, seeking, with respect to Lonetti, 
that the Guaranty be rescinded and declared unenforceable and asserting a claim for 
unjust enrichment. (R. 1, 10-13, 1325-29.) JDL initiated a separate action against 
Bilanzich seeking to enforce the Guaranty. (R. 2499-2501.) That action was 
consolidated into the instant litigation. (R. 671-72.) 
Bilanzich brought a motion for partial summary judgment against Lonetti asserting 
that conditions precedent to the enforcement of the Guaranty, as contained in the Term 
Sheet, did not occur, and therefore the Guaranty was not enforceable. (R. 1735-1736.) In 
that motion, Bilanzich asserted, as undisputed fact, that "[t]he Term sheet and Bilanzich 
3
 In reviewing the record, it appears that there are at least two pages in volume 8 of the 
record with the page number 2084. Page number 2084 cited herein is to Lonetti's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Bilanzich's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
4
 A copy of the Term Sheet is attached as Addendum B. 
5
 A copy of the Guaranty is attached as Addendum C. 
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Guaranty are the only written agreements between the Lonettis and Bilanzich." (R. 
1731.) Nowhere in the Term Sheet is there mention of an award of attorney fees to the 
prevailing party in litigation concerning the same. (R. 1776-1777; see also Add. B.) The 
trial court granted Bilanzich's motion. (R. 2221-2223.) 
Thereafter, Bilanzich, through his attorney, approached Lonetti's attorneys about 
settlement. (R. 2456; see also Add. D. Aff. Wade *[|5.) Bilanzich had sent a letter 
outlining his proposed settlement terms to Lonetti. (R. 2456, 2460-61.) However, 
numerous settlement discussions concerning the remaining claims occurred following the 
time Bilanzich sent this letter. (R. 2447, 2455-2457.)6 
Pursuant to these settlement discussions, Bilanzich offered to dismiss all 
remaining claims against Lonetti in exchange for Lonetti waiving his right to appeal the 
trial court's entry of partial summary judgment. (R. 2456-2461.) During the settlement 
negotiations, it was communicated to Lonetti's attorneys that acceptance of the settlement 
offer would bring the litigation between Bilanzich and Lonetti to a conclusion and that 
Lonetti would have no further liability relative to claims by Bilanzich. (R. 2456-2457.) 
Pursuant to these representations, and out of a desire to see the litigation come to 
an end, Lonetti agreed to the settlement. (R. 2457.) In connection with the settlement, 
Bilanzich prepared a joint motion and stipulation for dismissal and an order of dismissal, 
which were forwarded to Lonetti's attorneys. (R. 2409, 2421.) After obtaining approval 
of the settlement, Bilanzich, without providing any notice to Lonetti, filed a motion for 
award of attorney fees and costs seeking fees and non-taxable costs in the amount of 
6
 Affidavits setting forth these discussions are attached at Addendum D. 
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$89,161.92. (R. 2385-86, 2410, 2456-57.) In the motion Bilanzich claimed he was the 
prevailing party in the litigation and was entitled to attorney fees and costs under the 
terms of the Guaranty and Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5. (R. 2391-92.) 
Lonetti opposed the motion on the grounds that (1) there was no contractual or 
statutory authority or basis for Bilanzich to obtain an attorney fees award against Lonetti 
and (2) Bilanzich's motion for fees was contrary to and a violation of his settlement 
agreement with Lonetti. (R. 2427-2438.) 
On May 4, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. (R. 2248.) At that 
hearing, the trial court, sua sponte, asked the parties to address an issue neither had 
considered in their memoranda, which the trial court believed was threshold to the 
motion. (R. 2248 Tr. 6:20-22.) The trial court stated, "[t]he law of the case and the 
Court's [partial summary judgment] ruling on this matter already is that [Bilanzich] has 
no liability under that guarantee, and if he has no liability under that guarantee how can 
he come back and get attorneys fees under something that is basically a nullity as to his 
legal rights and responsibilities. That's what worries me." (R. 2248 Tr. 3:21-25, 4:1.) 
The court continued, " I . . . need some authority to back up what is basically a 
legal consequence of the law of the case, and no one seems to have addressed it[.]" (Id 
at Tr. 6:20-22.) The trial court instructed both parties to submit supplemental 
memoranda addressing the issue. (See id. at Tr. 7:2-4.) The parties provided 
supplemental briefing to address the issue. (R. 2520-2536.) On June 23, 2004, the trial 
court, in a signed minute entry, denied Bilanzich's motion for attorney fees. (R. 2560.) 
Bilanzich appeals. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly denied Bilanzich's motion for an award of attorney fees. 
Its previous ruling granting partial summary judgment for Bilanzich nullified the 
Guaranty and thus precluded Bilanzich from thereafter relying on the Guaranty to claim 
an award of attorney fees against Lonetti. In making this determination the trial court 
faithfully followed established precedent of our appellate courts and reached the decision 
mandated by such precedent—that one cannot avoid a contractual obligation by having it 
declared unenforceable and then rely on that very contract to claim an attorney fees 
award. 
There are at least two alternative grounds for affirmance. First, the Guaranty at 
issue does not provide for an attorney fees award. In Utah, attorney fees are awardable 
only if authorized by statute or contract." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ^[17, 40 
P.3d 1119 (citation omitted). When authorized by contract, attorney fees "are awardable 
only in accordance with the explicit terms of the contract and only to the extent permitted 
by the contract." Wardlev Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(citation and quotation omitted). The Guaranty makes passing reference to attorney fees 
but does not specifically provide for an attorney fees award in litigation concerning the 
Guaranty itself. Under Utah law, this is fatal to a claim for attorney fees arising out of a 
contract. 
Additionally, under the plain language of the reciprocal attorney fees statute, at 
least one party to an agreement must be entitled to attorney fees before the other party 
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can claim a reciprocal right to attorney fees. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (2002). 
Because the Guaranty contains no provision for an award to Lonetti in litigation 
concerning the Guaranty, Bilanzich cannot claim a reciprocal right to recover attorney 
fees under section 78-27-56.5. This is so, regardless of whether or not Lonetti may have 
sought recovery of his own attorney fees incurred to enforce the Guaranty against 
Bilanzich. See Fericks v. Soffe, 2004 UT 85, |25, 100 P.3d 1200. 
Second, Bilanzich's motion for attorney fees is contrary to his settlement 
agreement with Lonetti. Bilanzich agreed to dismiss his remaining claims against Lonetti 
if Lonetti agreed to forego an appeal of the trial court's entry of partial summary 
judgment. In essence, both parties agreed to lay down their weapons and go their 
separate ways. However, once Lonetti dropped his weapon, Bilanzich continued the 
battle he agreed to walk away from by filing his motion seeking $89,000-plus in attorney 
fees and costs. Bilanzich's decision to continue the litigation by seeking attorney fees 
from Lonetti is a breach of that agreement. Under Utah law, this Court may summarily 
enforce that agreement by affirming the trial court's order denying Bilanzich's motion. 
In this regard, settlement agreements are governed by the basic rules of contract 
law. Therefore, at a minimum, this issue requires remand to the trial court to determine 
whether there was in fact a meeting of the minds sufficient to constitute an agreement to 
settle the case. Thus, even if this Court determines that Bilanzich is entitled to attorney 
fees under the Guaranty or reciprocal fees statute, it cannot remand to the trial court with 
instructions to award such fees without first requiring the trial court to address the 
settlement issue. 
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ARGUMENT 
L BILANZICH HAS NO LEGAL BASIS TO RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES 
UNDER THE GUARANTY OR THE RECIPROCAL FEES STATUTE. 
A. The Guaranty Does Not Provide For An Attorney Fees Award. 
Bilanzich first argues that the Guaranty contains an attorney fees provision. This 
argument is meritless. "In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute 
or contract." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ^jl7, 40 P.3d 1119 (citation 
omitted). When authorized by contract, attorney fees "'are awardable only in accordance 
with the explicit terms of the contract and only to the extent permitted by the contract.'" 
Wardlev Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Maynard v. 
Wharton, 912 P.2d 446, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)). 
The only provision in the Guaranty that references attorney fees is the last 
sentence in the second paragraph which states: "This Guaranty includes all principal, 
interest, costs, expenses, and attorney fees incurred in collection of the Note and 
realization of the security." The Note is a reference to the promissory note and 
Modification between Reese's Enterprises, Inc. and Lonetti. The security referenced in 
the Guaranty, is not the Guaranty itself, it is the trust deed referenced in the Note and 
Modification. Bilanzich is not a party to the Note, the Modification, or the trust deed 
referenced therein. 
There is no ambiguity with regard to the subject provision of the Guaranty. 
Bilanzich has simply guaranteed payment of principal, interest, cost, expenses, and 
attorney fees incurred in any collection of the Note and realization of the security 
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thereunder. What the Guaranty does not provide and cannot be construed to mean, 
however, is that the prevailing party in litigation to enforce the Guaranty is entitled to an 
award of attorney fees. 
Cases wherein recovery of attorney fees has been founded upon contractual 
language have routinely and without fail involved contracts which contain unambiguous 
and clear reference to recovery of fees by the prevailing party as a result of some 
triggering mechanism contained within the terms of the contract at issue. See Kraatz v. 
Heritage Imports, 2003 UT App 201, Tf23, 71 P.3d 201, cert, denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 
2003) (providing "defaulting party shall pay all expenses and costs incurred by the other 
party in enforcing the terms hereof); Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App 404, Tfl 1, 38 P.3d 
1001 (providing for attorney fees in "litigation . . . to enforce" the contract); Keith 
Jorgensen's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 128, 1ffl25-26, 26 P.3d 872 
(providing for award of attorney fees if one party "institutes any action or proceeding 
against the other relating to the provisions of this Lease or any default hereunder"); 
Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(providing "the prevailing party to such resulting action shall have a right to recover from 
the non-prevailing party any and all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' 
fees"); Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (providing 
that party failing to perform agreement "agrees to pay all expenses of enforcing this 
agreement, or of any right arising out of the breach thereof, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee") (emphasis original)). 
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Rather than relying on the terms of the Guaranty or Utah law governing attorney 
fee awards, Bilanzich relies on two non-Utah cases in support of his argument—neither 
of which are on point or persuasive. He cites Ashland Oil Inc. v. Cardinal Fuels, Inc., 
872 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1989) {unpublished table decision)1 for the proposition that the 
language in the Guaranty de facto establishes a right to an award of attorney fees by a 
guarantor in his position. (Br. at 9-10.) However, the court in Ashland Oil does not 
provide any analysis or discussion of the substantive law governing an award of attorney 
fees under the agreement it was addressing—in fact, the court does not even quote from 
or provide an excerpt of the agreement containing the fee provision at issue. See 1989 
WL 28404 **2. This is hardly the type of analysis that would mandate or justify a 
departure from clearly established Utah law. 
The same must be said of the court's analysis in the other case relied upon by 
Bilanzich, Connecticut National Bank v. Foley, 560 A.2d 475 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989). 
(Br. at 10-11.) There, in reference to an attorney fees award to a guarantor, the court 
stated that "[t]his claim requires little discussion[,]" id at 478, and it provides none. 
Significantly, the case has never been cited in a published decision for the proposition 
that Bilanzich advances here. Thus, while the contractual language in Foley may bear 
some similarity to the Guaranty at issue here, without more, it is not enough to displace 
the rules governing recovery of attorney fees under a contract pursuant to Utah law. 
Finally, Bilanzich baldly asserts that Lonetti's prayer for recovery of attorney fees 
from Bilanzich constitutes some type of admission that the Guaranty provides for an 
For the Court's convenience, a copy of Ashland Oil is attached as Addendum E. 
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award of attorney fees. (Br. at 10.) This is also a meritless assertion. Attorney fees are 
not recoverable merely because one party has prayed for the same in their complaint. See 
Fericks v. Soffe, 2004 UT 85, ^ j25, 100 P.3d 1200. Allegations or relief sought in a 
complaint do not replace language in a contract. See id. Moreover, the complaint against 
Bilanzich, while generally seeking recovery of attorney fees, does not specifically allege 
that such fees are recoverable under the terms of the Guaranty. (R. 2499-2501.) Thus, 
this Court must reject Bilanzich's meritless attempt to create a fees provision out of 
whole cloth by supplanting language in a contract with a general prayer for relief in a 
complaint. 
In sum, the Guaranty does not contain an attorney fees provision that would entitle 
Bilanzich to an award of attorney fees incurred in litigation involving the Guaranty. 
Therefore, this Court can summarily affirm the trial court on this basis alone. 
B. Without An Underlying Contract Providing For An Attorney Fees 
Award, Bilanzich Has No Claim For Recovery Of Fees Under The 
Reciprocal Attorney Fees Statute. 
Bilanzich next argues that Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 entitles him to an award 
of attorney fees, (Br. at 11.) The plain language and threshold requirement of reciprocal 
recovery of attorney fees under section 78-27-56.5 is that at least one party to the 
agreement be entitled to attorney fees in litigation concerning the agreement. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (2002) (reciprocal right to fees exists only where "at least one 
party" has right to recover fees). Section 78-27-56.5 does not provide and cannot be 
stretched to mean that the simple mention of the term "attorney fees" in an agreement 
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gives any party the right to an award of attorney fees if it is a prevailing party in litigation 
involving that agreement. 
Because the Guaranty does not provide for an award of attorney fees to Lonetti 
against Bilanzich in litigation concerning the Guaranty, the reciprocal attorney fees 
statute provides no basis for such an award to Bilanzich. Therefore, Bilanzich is not 
entitled to his attorney fees under section 78-27-56.5. 
To be sure, Bilanzich asserts in his issue statement and implies in the substance of 
his brief that the Modification provides some basis for an award of attorney fees to 
Bilanzich under section 78-27-56.5. (Br. at 1, 10.) This argument, whether express or 
implied, is without merit for two reasons. 
First, as set forth in detail above, it is undisputed that Bilanzich is not a party to 
the Note or the Modification. In Anglin v, Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc., 2001 
UT App 341, 37 P.3d 267, this Court addressed this same situation and held that the 
reciprocal right to recover attorney fees on a promissory note or other writing under 
section 78-27-56.5 is limited and restricted "to include only the parties to the original 
promissory note, not any party to the litigation." IcL at ^10. Because Bilanzich is not a 
party to the Note or the Modification, he has no right to recover attorney fees under 
section 78-27-56.5. 
Second, the Modification is not subject to section 78-27-56.5. Rather, it is subject 
to Nevada law (see Add. A *|4) which does not have a reciprocal attorney fees statute. 
See Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010 (governing award of attorney's fees); see also Pandelis 
Construction Co., Inc. v. Jones-Viking Assocs., 734 P.2d 1236, 1238 n.3 (Nev. 1987) 
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(holding that an attorney fees provision which by its terms applies only to one party to an 
agreement must be enforced as written no matter how unfair that result). Moreover, as in 
Utah, see Wardley, 962 P.2d at 92, in Nevada, a court can only award attorney fees to 
actual parties to the agreement containing an attorney fees provision—not any party to 
the litigation concerning the agreement. See Wyatt v. Bowers, 747 P.2d 881, 884 (Nev. 
1987). 
Thus, to the extent Bilanzich claims his fees based on the Modification or Note in 
connection with Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5, his claims must be rejected. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT ITS PRIOR 
RULING DECLARING THE GUARANTY A NULLITY DEPRIVES 
BILANZICH OF ANY CLAIM TO ATTORNEY FEES. 
Even if this Court determines that the Guaranty does contain an attorney fees 
provision, the trial court correctly concluded that its prior ruling declaring the Guaranty a 
nullity deprives Bilanzich of any claim to an award of attorney fees under the Guaranty. 
Under Utah law, a party that successfully avoids or nullifies a contract cannot, at 
the same time, claim the benefit of an attorney fees provision in the contract. The 
seminal and controlling case on this issue is BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456 
(Utah 1978). In BLT, the plaintiff sought specific performance of a written contract with 
the defendant. See id. at 456. In defense, the defendant sought to rescind the contract. 
See id. The trial court, finding a failure of condition precedent to the effectiveness of the 
contract, ordered rescission of the same and also awarded the defendant his attorney fees 
pursuant to a provision in the contract providing for such fees. See id. at 457-58. 
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The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rescission of the contract but 
reversed the award of attorney fees. See id. at 456. In reversing the attorney fees award, 
the supreme court adopted the rule that a party "may not avoid the contract and, at the 
same time, claim the benefits of the provision for attorney fees." Id. at 458 (citation 
omitted). This rule applies here. 
Bilanzich avoided the Guaranty by having it nullified and declared unenforceable. 
That ruling, as observed by the trial court at the May 4 hearing, constitutes the law of the 
case. (R. 2248 Tr. 6:20-22.) See also Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 
1037 (Utah 1995) (stating "a decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is 
binding in successive stages of the same litigation"). Under BLT and the law of the case 
doctrine, Bilanzich cannot claim the benefit of an attorney fees provision under a 
Guaranty he previously avoided by having the trial court declare the same unenforceable. 
Although BLT was decided prior to the enactment of Utah's reciprocal attorney 
o 
fees statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5, subsequent case law makes clear that BLT 
has survived the enactment of 78-27-56.5, and is the current state of law in Utah on this 
issue. See, e.g.. Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App 404, Tfl4, 38 P.3d 1001 (stating "because 
the party had successfully rescinded the contract, the contract no longer existed, and 
therefore they could no longer rely upon any of its terms." (quoting BLT, 586 P.2d at 
458)). 
Section 78-27-56.5 is applicable to cases involving contracts executed after April 29, 
1986. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (2002). BLT was decided in 1978. 
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In Chase v. Scott, the party seeking fees under the contract at issue mounted a 
successful defense to an action for rescission of that contract. See id. at [^14. This Court 
determined that the party mounting the successful defense to rescission is entitled to an 
award of attorney fees under the contract because the contract remains in force and effect. 
See id. at ^[16-17. The court then expressly determined that this holding was consistent 
with both BLT and section 78-27-56.5. 
This Court recognized that "[t]he [supreme] court reasoned [in BLT] because the 
party [seeking fees] had successfully rescinded the contract, the contract no longer 
existed, and therefore they could no longer rely upon any of its terms." IdL at [^14. It then 
stated that "our [holding] would be consistent with BLT limiting awards under this type 
of contractual provision to only those parties who successfully defend against rescission 
and thus enforce the contract." Id fl6. The court of appeals determined that its holding 
was consistent with the reciprocal attorney fees statute because either party would be 
entitled to attorney fees if they successfully defended against rescission. See id. 
Thus, according to Chase, had either party in the instant case successfully defeated 
an attempt by the other party to have the Guaranty declared unenforceable, he would 
have been entitled to fees under the Guaranty because the Guaranty would have survived 
and remained in place.9 However, where, as here, the Guaranty is declared unenforceable 
and is a nullity, BLT and Chase foreclose any right Bilanzich may have had to obtain his 
attorney fees based on the Guaranty. 
9
 Of course, as set forth above in Point I, we maintain that under Utah law, the Guaranty 
contains no provision awarding attorney fees to any party in litigation concerning the 
Guaranty. We only assume it does here for purposes of analysis under Point II. 
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In sum? the trial court declared the Guaranty unenforceable. This was a result of 
Bilanzich's own motion that allowed him to avoid his obligations under the Guaranty. 
Because the Guaranty has been avoided and is of no force or effect, Bilanzich cannot rely 
upon its terms to obtain an award of attorney fees. The trial court correctly denied 
Bilanzich's motion for fees on this basis. This Court must affirm. 
III. BILANZICH'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES IS CONTRARY TO HIS 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH LONETTI. 
Bilanzich's motion for attorney fees is contrary to his settlement agreement with 
Lonetti. This agreement was reached after extensive discussions between counsel for the 
parties in which Bilanzich agreed to dismiss his remaining claims against Lonetti if 
Lonetti agreed to forego an appeal of the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment. 
As set forth in undisputed affidavits submitted by counsel for Lonetti {see Add. D), it was 
understood by Lonetti that this settlement meant that the litigation between Bilanzich and 
Lonetti would come to a conclusion and that Lonetti would have no further liability to 
Bilanzich. Yet, obviously, the litigation has not ended. Bilanzich chose to continue the 
litigation and further expose Lonetti to liability—contrary to the assurances and 
representations made to Lonetti's counsel in the course of negotiations. (R. 2457; see 
also Add. B. Wade Aff. 16(b).) 
In response to these affidavits and arguments raised below, Bilanzich simply 
asserted that attorney fees were not discussed and were not part of the settlement 
discussions. (R. 2492-2493.) However, Bilanzich did not submit a single affidavit 
disputing the facts set out in the Lonetti affidavits. (R. 2487-2506.) Rather, Bilanzich 
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treats this as a small matter and takes comfort in the fact that there was no written 
agreement to waive attorney fees and costs. (Br. at 4.) This is no small matter. 
In Utah, "[i]t is a basic rule that the law favors the settlement of disputes." 
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Sys.. Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(citation omitted). In this regard, courts have inherent authority to summarily enforce 
settlement agreements. See id. Moreover, contrary to Bilanzich's assertions, it is of no 
legal consequence that the parties have not signed a settlement agreement or that the 
settlement agreement is not reduced to writing. See id. at 584-85. Rather, "[settlement 
agreements are governed by the rules applied to general contract actions." Sackler v. 
Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). "Under the principles of basic contract law, a 
contract is not formed unless there is a meeting of the minds." Id 
Here, it is undisputed that Lonetti's understanding of the settlement was that if he 
waived an appeal of the trial court's partial summary judgment, he would be allowed to 
walk away from the litigation unscathed, having no further liability to Bilanzich. While 
the issue of attorney fees may not have been specifically addressed in conversations or 
correspondence between the parties, it is of little consequence. The end of litigation 
means the end of litigation—no matter how Bilanzich chooses to justify his actions, his 
motion for almost $90,000 in fees and costs directly contradicts his representations and 
assurances which constitute the basis for the settlement agreement. 
It is well settled that this Court can affirm the trial court on any alternate ground or 
theory that is supported in the record. See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ^|18, 29 P.3d 
1225. Bilanzich's failure to dispute the affidavits submitted by Lonetti with affidavits of 
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his own is telling. This is particularly true where significant discussions took place after 
Bilanzich sent his settlement letter. (R. 2456; see also Add. D. Wade Aff. 1fl[5-6.) The 
affidavits clearly establish a settlement in which the litigation between Lonetti and 
Bilanzich would cease, Lonetti would forego his right to appeal, and face no further 
exposure or liability from Bilanzich. Clearly, Bilanzich's continued litigation is in 
violation of the terms of this agreement. Therefore, this Court would be justified in 
summarily enforcing the terms of this agreement by affirming the trial court on such 
grounds. 
Alternatively, if this Court determines that Bilanzich is somehow entitled to 
attorney fees, it must remand to the trial court with instructions to address the settlement 
agreement issue prior to awarding such fees to Bilanzich. See Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d 
888, 890 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating "where material facts concerning the existence or terms 
of an agreement to settle are in dispute, the parties must be allowed an evidentiary 
hearing"). Here, at minimum, there is a dispute as to the terms of the settlement 
agreement, and a genuine question as to whether there was a meeting of the minds as it 
related to integral terms of that agreement, namely, the question of attorney fees. 
Such a remand would be consistent with the trial court's own expectations and 
assurances to Lonetti. At the May 4 hearing, the trial court stated that there would be no 
reason to address the settlement agreement issue if the issue it wanted addressed {see 
Point II supra) mooted any claim Bilanzich had to attorney fees. (R. 2248 Tr. 7:8-25, 
8:1-9.) The trial court then assured Lonetti's counsel that the opportunity to address the 
settlement issue would be available to him. (See id at Tr. 8:4-25, 9:1.) Specifically, the 
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trial court stated that, if after the supplemental briefing on the nullification issue "I find 
[Bilanzich's] position is still well taken, at least as to that issue, then we'll give you a 
chance to calendar it and talk about everything else." {Id. at Tr. 8:24-25, 9:1.) 
In sum, this Court may affirm on the alternate basis that Bilanzich's motion for 
attorney fees violated his settlement agreement with Lonetti. In the alternative, if this 
Court finds Bilanzich is entitled to an award of attorney fees, it must remand with 
instructions to the trial court to conduct a hearing to address the settlement agreement 
issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court must affirm the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted this n --"day of April 2005. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
Terry/L. Wade 
BryanJ. Pattison 
Attorneys for JDL Holdings, L.C., and 
John Lonetti and Eunes Lonetti 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
In accordance with Utah R. App. P. 26(b), I, Bryan J. Pattison, certify that on 
V> April W , 2005,1 served two (2) copies of the BRIEF OF APPELLEES upon counsel for 
Appellant, via first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid, to the following address: 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Jefferson W. Gross 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Bryan JL Pattison 
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MODIFICATION OF NOTF. CT.rupT.Tl * y m r ^
 0 f ^ 
AND SECTTPTTV ^ r . p y ^ ^ ^ ^ - ^ ^ ^ 
WHEREAS, REESE'S ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nevada corporation (hereinafter 
referred to as BORROWER) executed a Promissory Note in the amount of ONE 
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED and NO/100 
DOLLARS ($1,780,600.00) dated December 31, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as NOTE) 
in favor of JOHN and EUNES LONETTI, JR., (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
LENDER) pursuant to the provisions of the Loan Agreement dated December 31,1996, 
which NOTE is secured by a Deed of Trust and Security Agreement, and 
WHEREAS, the Loan Agreement was amended on February 4, 1998, to reflect an 
additional loan from LENDER to BORROWER in the amount of THREE HUNDRED 
|TFTY FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT and 00/100 DOLLARS 
($354,938.00), and 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to modify certain provisions of the NOTE 
U o u t modifying the legal effect or priority of the subject Deed of Trust or Security 
Agreement to reflect the additional loan made on February 4, 1998. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the parties agree as 
ill :ows: 
L
 Modification of Fromi^ory Note. The parties hereto agree that the NOTE 
sjiall be modified as follows: 
be $?1 V ^ f n ^ ^ ^ ^ ° f ** N 0 T E M ° f *** 2> 1 9 ^ , shall be 2.2,167,717.00, which amount represents the balance of the principal and 
:40FFICE\WPWIN\CLIEKnLONETTMGRMWOT.MOD.AGR 1 
March 27,1998 
accrued 
1998. 
interest of the NOTE and the additional loan made on February 4 
b. Said adjusted balance together with interest thereon at the stated interest 
rate within the NOTE, shall be payable in accordance with the terms of the 
NOTE in monthly installments in the initial approximate amount vof 
$20,918.94 commencing April 1, 1998. 
2. No Modification of Deed of Trust or Security Agreement, The terms, 
covenants and conditions contained in the NOTE, Loan Agreement, Deed of Trust and 
Security Agreement, which are not modified by this Agreement shall remain operative 
and in full force and effect. This Agreement shall serve merely as an amendment to the 
NOTE and not an alteration of the subject Deed of Trust or Security Agreement, it being 
agreed and understood that the subject security instruments shall continue to remain a 
first obligation and encumbrance against property securing the NOTE. 
3. Attorney's Fees. If any action is instituted with respect to this Agreement or 
supporting documents, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
and costs to be paid by the other party. 
4. Law Governing. The laws of the State of Nevada shall govern the 
construction and interpretation of this Agreement 
5. Modification. This Agreement may not be modified or terminated orally, and 
no modification or attempt of waiver shall be valid, unless in writing, signed by all parties 
hereto. 
6. Benefit. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the 
respective parties hereto, their legal representatives, successors and assigns. 
C:\OFRCE\WPWIN\CIiE>mLONErn^GIU^OT-MOD.AGR 2 
March 27,1998 
7. Entire A greemenf. All understandings and agreements heretofore and 
,etween the parties are merged in this Agreement which alone fully and completely 
jxpresses their understanding and agreement 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreements the 
P l _ day of d^Jl
 1998> 
RENDER: 
LONETTI, JR. / EUNES LONETTI 
^ORROWER: 
REESE'S ENTERPRISES, INC., a 
Nevada corporation 
""") ^ " "" .-^ jy 
GA'YL^-REESE/kresident DEANNA REESE; Secretary/ 
Treasurer 
si 
qfFICE\WPWIN\CLIE3TOLONETTMGRWWOT-MOD.AGR 3 
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GUARANTY 
For value received, I, Michael Bilanzich, (Guarantor). Zs^i UJc^U*^ Ofi-
Sail LtxkjL. , $>ftcT C^b- County, Utah M/o9 . absolutely guarantee pay-
ment to John Lonetti Jr. and Eunes I Lonetti, of 2200 Red Oak, Las Vegas, Clark 
County Nevada 89109, of a Promissory Note dated December 31,1996, in the original 
principal amount of One Million Seven Hundred Eighty Thousand Six Hundred Dollars 
($1,780,600.00), executed by Reese's Enterprises, Inc., a Nevada Corporation obligor, 
and any amendments or modifications thereto. The Note has a current principal balance 
of $2,000,000.00 
Guarantor waives notice of acceptance of this Guaranty and waives diligence on 
the part of obligee in collection of the indebtedness. Obligee shall have the privilege of 
granting such renewals and extensions as obligee may deem proper, without notice to 
Guarantor. Guarantor further expressly waives notice of nonpayment, protest, and no-
tice of protest with respect to the indebtedness covered by this Guaranty. This Guar-
anty includes all principal, interest, costs, expenses, and attorney fees incurred in col-
lection of the Note and realization of the security. 
This Guaranty is in addition to such other security as obligee now or hereafter 
may have. Obligee may surrender or release all or any portion of such other security 
without affecting this Guaranty. It shall not be necessary for obligee to enforce payment 
by Guarantor of the indebtedness, to first institute suit, or to pursue or exhaust remedies 
against obligor, or against any other security that obligor may have. 
Guarantor acknowledges that this Guaranty is in effect and binding on Guarantor 
without reference to whether it is signed by any other person or persons. Guarantor 
agrees that this Guaranty shall continue in full force and effect notwithstanding the 
death of Guarantor, or the release by agreement or by operation of law of, or the exten-
sionof time to, any other guarantor or guarantors as to obligations then existing. 
Liability of Guarantor under this Guaranty shall not be affected or impaired by the 
existence, from time to time, of an indebtedness or liability of principal obligor to obligee 
in excess of the amount of this Guaranty. 
DATED THIS j>±_ day of S e p ' f e ^ U p . 1999. 
GUARANTOR: 
MICHAEL BILANZICH 
tfARVRiehards, Oonion 10070.00\guartmty2 092999 10070.nft2 
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F " 
Terry L. Wade (3882) 
Bryan J. Pattison (8766) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
192 East 200 North, Third Floor 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 674-0400 
Facsimile: (435) 628-1610 
Attorneys for JDL Holdings, L.C. and 
John Lonetti and Eunes Lonetti 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL T. BELANZICH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
McDONOUGH, a professional corporation, D. 
WILLIAMS RONNOW, an individual, 
REESE'S ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nevada 
corporation, JOHN LONETTI, an individual, 
EUNES I. LONETTI, an individual JDL 
HOLDINGS, L.L.C.. a Utah limited liability 
company, CAMBRIDGE CAPITAL GROUP, 
INC., a Delaware corporation, CAMBRIDGE 
HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation, 
ERIC CUMMINGS, an individual, JOHN C. 
HOWE, an individual, FOOTBRIDGE 
LIMITED TRUST, a Bermuda corporation, 
OLD HILL PARTNERS, a partnership, and 
DOES TV through X, 
AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY L. WADE 
Consolidated Case No. 010500411 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
TERRY L. WADE, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this 
Affidavit. 
2. I am an attorney with the law firm of Durham Jones & Pinegar representing 
Defendants John Lonetti, Eunes I. Lonetti, and JDL Holdings, L.L.C. in this matter. 
3. This affidavit is given in support of Defendants John Lonetti, Eunes I. Lonetti, and 
JDL Holdings, L.L.C, (hereinafter "Lonetti") Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Award of Attorney Fees and Costs. 
4. On December 15, 2003, the Court entered an Order for Partial Summary Judgment in 
this action, on Plaintiffs seventh cause of action for Declaratory Relief. 
5. As we were evaluating the merits of an appeal of the Court's Order for Partial 
Summary Judgment, we were contacted by Plaintiffs counsel, Jeff Gross, concerning the possibility 
of settling the case. His proposal was set forth in a letter dated January 15, 2004, which we 
received on that same date. This letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
6. After reviewing Mr. Gross' proposal for settlement, I spoke with him on Jan. 21, 
2004, and again on Jan. 27. While I do not purport to recall exact words used, the following points 
were discussed in these conversations: 
a. Mr. Gross indicated that his client wanted to bring the litigation to a 
conclusion. He offered to dismiss the remaining cause of action against Lonetti on condition 
that Lonetti would refrain from filing an appeal. 
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b. I stated to Mr. Gross that if we were to accept his proposal, and forgo the 
appeal, we would want the matter to be finally and completely concluded. I expressed that if 
Lonetti were to "walk", we would want to be sure that there would not be any remaining 
exposure to liability relative to him. In this regard, we discussed various scenarios in which 
further exposure might arise, and Mr. Gross repeatedly and consistently opined that he could 
not see any realistic possibility that Lonetti could be pursued further by anyone. 
c. I am certain that the fact was made clear to Mr. Gross that we would not 
waive the right of appeal, unless we were confident that Lonetti would not face further 
claims of any nature. 
d. Despite having clearly conveyed our concerns to Mr. Gross about further 
exposure to Lonetti, he never once made mention of his client's desire to recover attorney's 
fees and costs from Lonetti. The opportunity arose in multiple conversations with me, as 
well as another attorney in our office, Bryan Pattison. 
7. After conveying our client's acceptance of the proposal that both Mr. Gross' client 
and ours "walk", Mr. Gross prepared the documentation and pleadings to effect the settlement. He 
did not include in those pleadings or documents any reference to his client's claim for attorney's 
fees or costs. 
8. I can say that Mr. Gross' Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs is completely 
out of line with our discussions about ending the litigation and eliminating the exposure of Lonetti. 
DATED this IQJ*— day of March, 2004. 
[jJ «ZSU^ 
IRRY L. WADE 
^o 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to (or affirmed) before me this _IV_ day of March, 2004 by I J*-
TERRY L. WADE. 
)TARY PUBLIC 
Address: 
My Commission Expires: 
~~ JAIME GARGANO 
Notary Public 
F Stria of Utah 
My Comrn.Eipfr*i May 29,2008 
192 E 200 H 3rd Fl St George UT 84771] 
I hereby certify that on the 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Iff da^  day of March, 2004,1 served a copy of the foregoing 
AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY L. WADE on the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-
paid, addressed as follows: 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Jefferson W. Gross 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
SLC,UT 84111 
Eric L. Cummings 
CAMBRIDGE HOLDINGS GROUP, INC. 
c/o CAMBRIDGE CAPITAL GROUP, INC. 
PO Box One 
Cabin John, Maryland 20818-0001 
Eric L. Cummings 
6700 Persimmon Tree Road 
Bethesda, Maryland 20817-4320 
Rodney G. Snow 
Edwin C. Barnes 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2216 
Cambridge Capital Group, Inc. 
18 East 34th Street 
Savannah, Georgia 31401 
V. Lowry Snow 
J. Gregory Hardman 
SNOW, JENSEN & REECE 
134 North 200 East #302 
St. George, Utah 84770 
EXHIBIT A 
BXJRBIDGB AKXI M l T C H E U L 
A PARTNERSHIP Or PROFESSIONAL COWPORATION* 
ATTORNEYS! AMP C O U N S E L O R * AT LAW 
J E F F f c R S O N W. 0 R O 5 S PARKBIDE TOWER 
2 |S S O U T H STATE STREET, SUITE © 2 0 
S A L T LAJCR CITY, U T A H ti4tui-iio3 
January 15, 2004 
VIA FACSIMILE 
Bryan J. Pattison 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
192 East 200 North, 3rd Floor 
St. George, UT 84770 
Re: Bilanzich v, Jones Waldo, et al. 
Dear Bryan: 
You have asked me to memorialize how our client, Michael Bilanzich, is willing to 
proceed following the Court's Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment. As we have 
discussed, Mr. Bilanzich's remaining claim against the Lonettis and JDL Holdings, L.C., is 
for rescission, i.e, the parties would be restored to the position they were in prior to the failed 
transaction. If Mr. Bilanzich was to prevail on that claim at trial, one aspect of relief would be 
your clients' return of the $300,000 which they received from the Cambridge 
Defendants/Howe Defendants. Because the Cambridge Defendants/Howe Defendants have 
expressed their desire to continue the litigation in hopes of recovering this $300,000 from Mr. 
Bilanzich, we certainly have some motivation to continue pursuit of the claim. 
With that said, Mr. Bilanzich will proceed on one of two alternative routes: 
1. If John Lonetti* Eunes Lonetti and JDL Holdings, L.C., waive their right to 
appeal Judge Shumate's Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, Mr, 
Bilanzich will dismiss his claim for rescission with prejudice; or 
2. Mr, Bilanzich will continue to pursue his claim for rescission against your 
clients. 
We realize that, with Mr, Brindley's departure, you may still be in the process of 
getting up to speed on the matter. However, we need to have your answer within one week, 
i.e., by January 22, 2004, 
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If you have any questions, please call me. 
Sincerely, 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Jefferson W. Gross 
JWG:dms 
cc: Stephen Marshall 
Michael Bilanzich 
Terry L. Wade (3882) 
Bryan J. Pattison (8766) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
192 East 200 North, Third Floor 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 674-0400 
Facsimile: (435)628-1610 
Attorneys for JDL Holdings, L.C. and 
John Lonetti and Eunes Lonetti 
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BY. 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL T. BILANZICH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
McDONOUGH, a professional corporation, D. 
WILLIAMS RONNOW, an individual, 
REESE'S ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nevada 
corporation, JOHN LONETTI, an individual, 
EUNES I. LONETTI, an individual JDL 
HOLDINGS. L.L.C.. a Utah limited liability 
company, CAMBRIDGE CAPITAL GROUP, 
INC., a Delaware corporation, CAMBRIDGE 
HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation, 
ERIC CUMMINGS, an individual, JOHN C. 
HOWE, an individual, FOOTBRIDGE 
LIMITED TRUST, a Bermuda corporation, 
OLD HILL PARTNERS, a partnership, and 
DOES IV through X, 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN J. PATTISON 
Consolidated Case No. 010500411 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
BRYAN J. PATTISON, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this 
Affidavit. 
2. I am an attorney with the law firm of Durham Jones & Pinegar representing 
Defendants John Lonetti, Eunes I. Lonetti, and JDL Holdings, L.L.C. in this matter. 
3. During January and February of 2004,1 engaged in extensive discussions with 
Jefferson Gross, attorney for Plaintiff Michael Bilanzich in the above-captioned matter. 
4. Our discussions concerned my clients seeking a Rule 54(b) certification and appeal 
of the court's granting of Bilanzich's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, 
foregoing certification and appeal in exchange for Bilanzich dismissing his remaining claims 
against my clients. 
5. The understanding with regard to the dismissal was that the litigation between my 
clients and Bilanzich would end and my clients would have no further liability to Bilanzich. 
DATED this jl) day of March, 2004. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to (or affirmed) before me this JJl day of March, 2004 by 
BRYAN J. PATTISON 
<%4/QTJ~^ 
* , 
JTARY PUBLIC ( j 1 
Address: 
My Commission Expires: 
JAIME GARGANO 
Notary PubBc 
Stats of Utah 
._ My Cofnm.Expfrw May 29,2005 
1 182 E 200 N 3rd R5t George UT 64771 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the / ( / day of March, 2004,1 served a copy of the foregoing 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN J. PATTISON on the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage 
pre-paid, addressed as follows: 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Jefferson W. Gross 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
SLC,UT 84111 
Rodney G. Snow 
Edwin C. Barnes 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2216 
Eric L. Cummings 
CAMBRIDGE HOLDINGS GROUP, INC. 
c/o CAMBRIDGE CAPITAL GROUP, INC. 
PO Box One 
Cabin John, Maryland 20818-0001 
Cambridge Capital Group, Inc. 
18 East 34th Street 
Savannah, Georgia 31401 
Eric L. Cummings 
6700 Persimmon Tree Road 
Bethesda, Maryland 20817-4320 
V. Lowry Snow 
SNOW, JENSEN & REECE 
134 North 200 East #302 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. 
(The Court's decision is referenced in a "Table of 
Decisions Without Reported Opinions" appearing in 
the Federal Reporter. Use FI CTA4 Rule 36 for rules 
regarding the citation of unpublished opinions.) 
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. 
ASHLAND OIL, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
CARDINAL FUELS, INC., Home Oil Company, 
Inc., Southside Oil Company, Inc., 
Tucker W. McLaughlin, Defendants-Appellants. 
No. 88-3886. 
Argued Feb. 10, 1989. 
Decided March 28, 1989. 
W.D.Va. 
AFFIRMED. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. 
Turk, Chief District Judge. (CA-81 -1028). 
Mary Stewart Murphy (Wyatt B. Durrette, Jr., 
McCarthy & Durrette, P.C. on brief) for appellants. 
Frank Kenneth Friedman (Michael A. Geary, 
Woods, Rogers & Hazelgrove on brief) for appellee. 
Before K.K. HALL, SPROUSE, and WILKINS, 
Circuit Judges. 
PER CURIAM: 
**1 Cardinal Fuels, Inc., Home Oil Company, Inc., 
Southside Oil Company, Inc. (the Oil Companies), 
and Tucker W. McLaughlin (collectively, the 
Defendants) appeal from the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Ashland Oil, Inc. on their 
counterclaim for abuse of process. McLaughlin also 
appeals from an award of attorneys' fees to Ashland. 
We affirm. 
I. 
In 1983 McLaughlin, acting in his official capacity 
as president of the Oil Companies, signed a 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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promissory note to Ashland. He also executed a 
personal guaranty agreement guaranteeing payment 
of the note and any attorneys' fees and costs incurred 
in its collection. The Oil Companies were identified 
in the note as Virginia corporations with addresses in 
Richlands, Covington, and Halifax, Virginia. The 
Halifax address, which was also listed in the guaranty 
agreement for McLaughlin, was the address used by 
Ashland in mailing statements for the note. 
When the Oil Companies defaulted on the note in 
1985, Ashland filed suit against the Defendants for 
payment under the note and the guaranty agreement. 
It also sought attorneys' fees from McLaughlin under 
the guaranty agreement. Ashland first attempted 
service of the summons and complaint by certified 
mail at what it allegedly believed to be McLaughlin's 
personal address: 1740 Fifth Street, Isle of Palms, 
South Carolina. The correct address was, in fact, 17 
Forty-fifth Street. When the papers were returned 
unclaimed, service was again attempted by regular 
mail to the same address, also unsuccessfully. Service 
was finally made on the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia pursuant to Va.Code 
Aim. S 8.01-329 (1950 & 1984 Repl.Vol). 
Defendants failed to timely appear and default 
judgments were entered against them, jointly and 
severally, for more than $200,000.00 in principal and 
interest due under the note and against McLaughlin 
for attorneys' fees of $35,000.00. When McLaughlin 
subsequently learned of the default judgments, 
Defendants moved to set them aside pursuant to 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c) and 60(b). 
For good cause shown, the district court set aside the 
default judgments. Defendants then filed an answer 
and a counterclaim for abuse of process arising from 
the attempted service of the summons and complaint 
at the South Carolina address. The district court 
granted summary judgment to Ashland on both its 
complaint and the counterclaim, and also awarded it 
attorneys' fees of $12,500.00. 
II. 
In Virginia, a claim for abuse of process lies for "the 
perversion of regularly-issued process to accomplish 
some ulterior purpose for which the procedure was 
not intended." Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Mount 
Vernon Assoc, 235 Va. 53 L 539. 369 S.E.2d 857, 
862 (1988). The essential elements of the claim are 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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"the existence of an ulterior purpose" and "an act in 
the use of the process not proper in the regular 
prosecution of the proceedings." Id. 
Defendants' abuse of process counterclaim rested on 
the use by Ashland of the incorrect personal address 
of McLaughlin to attempt service of process rather 
than the Virginia business address to which it had 
previously sent the statements. The district court 
properly granted summary judgment to Ashland 
because the essence of Defendants' claim was the 
allegedly improper manner in which Ashland issued 
the process. "The gravaman of the tort [of abuse of 
process] lies in the abuse or the perversion of the 
process after it has been issued," id, not in the 
issuance of the process. 
III. 
**2 The guaranty agreement provided that 
McLaughlin would pay Ashland its "reasonable" 
attorneys' fees incurred in collection of the note in the 
event of default. At the time of the hearing on the 
motion for summary judgment, attorneys for Ashland 
claimed a total of between $4000.00 and $5000.00 in 
fees, to date, for their efforts to collect on the note. 
Although collection had not been completed, the 
district court awarded Ashland a lump sum fee of 
$12,500.00. McLaughlin contends that the award 
was unreasonable and unsupported by sufficient 
evidence as to value of the services rendered. 
Determination of reasonableness is governed by 
South Carolina law since the guaranty agreement was 
executed by McLaughlin in South Carolina. See Erie 
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins. 304 U.S. 64 H938): 
Occidental Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bankers & 
Shippers Ins. Co., 564 F.Supp. 1501. 1503 
(W.D.Va.l983\ Under the law of South Carolina, 
the district court award of attorneys' fees equalling 
approximately six percent of the total debt to be 
collected is reasonable on its face even in the absence 
of evidence regarding the value of the services 
rendered. See Farmers & Merchants Bank v. 
Farqnoll 21A S.C. 23. 25-26, 260 S.E.2d 185. 187 
(1979). 
AFFIRMED. 
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